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With the new statute condonation could not be found from the single fact
of continued residence in the same abode. As suggested before, other facts must
be present. Some of the circumstances which a court will look to in deciding
whether condonation has occurred are the frequency, if any, of sexual inter-
course (without fear or force), the presence of other expressions of conjugal
kindness, love and affection, the amount of social intercourse and the observance
of other marital amenities, i.e., eating together, shopping together, etc. Factors
that weigh against such a finding are continuing acts of physical aggression, sex
by fear, continued expressions of a desire to leave regardless of social intercourse
and the purpose of staying or cohabitating but without sexual intercourse i.e.,
not to seek reconciliation but to see to welfare of children or repair of house"
or to avoid social embarrassment,96 all of which indicate a high degree of segre-
gated life.
The object of this decisional process should be to conclude from all the
facts, including the plaintiff's presence in court and the realities of married life,
that such a reconciliation of the parties has occurred or that there have been
sufficient Tanifestations of conjugal affection to warrant a conclusion that the
plaintiff has forgiven the other spouse, making any judicial action unnecessary
and undesirable. If a state of mind judicially labelled as forgiveness is to be
found, then all of the plaintiff's conduct must be considered if an accurate finding
of condonation is to be made. Such caution would be helpful to insure that the
laudable policy of preserving relatively stable family life will not be used to
force parties to remain in a "meaningless and hateful bond.197
LEsLiE G. Foscnio
THE EVOLUTION OF THE Du'm RULE IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (1954-
1963)
When a convicted defendant appeals the denial of a pro se motion seeking
mental examination, and the appellate court affirms the denial in a per curiam
decision,1 one does not generally expect two of the three judges to write con-
curring opinions. When these concurring opinions deal not at all with the issue
on appeal, but rather treat and interpret a case which one of the judges admits
"is not here involved, ' 2 one begins to wonder. But, when the Judges involved
are Chief Judge Bazelon and Judge Burger of the U.S. Court of Appeals, Dis-
Cf. Stahl v. Stahl, 221 N.Y.S.2d 931, 945, modified on other grounds, 16 A.D.2d 467, 228
N.Y.S.2d 724 (1st Dep't 1962) (restoration of marital rights no consideration for separation
agreement) ; Tolstoy, op. cit. supra note 91, at 73-74.
95. Kahnovsky v. Kahnovsky, 67 R.I. 63, 20 A.2d 679 (1941).
96. McCallum v. McCalum, 153 Wash. 1, 279 Pac. 88 (1929) (avoid "scene" at
parent's home).
97. List v. List, 189 Misc. 261, 264, 61 N.Y.S.2d 809, 812 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
1. Gray v. United States, 319 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
2. Id. at 726.
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trict of Columbia Circuit, and the opinions deal with the test of criminal re-
sponsibility in the "land of Durham," the District of Columbia, the anomaly
is explicable.
In the decade since Durham v. United States3 there has been continuous
flux and uncertainty about the test of criminal responsibility in the District
of Columbia. No issue has been the subject of such extended litigation4 or the
subject of such demand for change.5 While the instant case is of no importance
on its own facts to the evolution of Durham, it does serve as an excellent focal
point to illustrate the position and status of the two opposing judicial elements
in the conflict over the Durham Rule. In order to appreciate the dichotomy of
the two judges and their opinions in Gray v. United States, 319 F.2d 725 (D.C.
Cir. 1963), an historical background is presented.
The standard of criminal responsibility that had prevailed in the District
of Columbia prior to the Durham case was the common law "right-wrong
test," as set out in the M'Nagkten case6 used in conjunction with and sup-
plemented by the "irresistible impulse test."7 The right-wrong element of the
test had been approved for use in the District of Columbia as early as 1882,8
and is at present, the exclusive test of criminal responsibility in most- common
law jurisdictions within the United States.9 Under this test, the accused is
not responsible for his criminal act, if he either does not know the nature and
quality of the act, or does not know that the act is wrong; but note, both
elements are not conjunctively necessary.'0
While the court had reaffirmed the validity of the "right-wrong test" sub-
sequent to its adoption," there had arisen by 1929 sufficient dissatisfaction with
the rule that the court felt obligated to modify it by the addition of the "ir-
resistible impulse test" as a supplementary test.'2 Under this formulation, the
court in the Smith case held:
The modern doctrine is that the degree of insanity which will re-
lieve the accused of the consequences of a criminal act must be such
as to create in his mind an uncontrollable impulse to commit the
offense charged. This impulse must be such as to override the reason
3. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
4. Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853, 864 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
S. Reid, Criminal Insanity and Psychiatric Evidence: The Challenge of Blocker, 8 How.
L.Y. 1 (1962).
6. M'Naghten's Case, 10 Clark & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
7. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 869 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
8. Ibid., citing United States v. Guiteau, 12 D.C. (1 Mackey) 498, 550 (1882). Guiteau
was reaffirmed in United States v. Lee, 15 D.C. (4 Mackey) 489, 496 (1886).
9. Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 1447, especially 1452 n.6 (1956). The M'Naghten rule is fol-
lowed in, among other jurisdictions, Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas,
Kentucky, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Wyoming, and England.
Several states have included the "right-wrong" test in statutes as in Louisiana, Minnesota,
New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Colorado, and South Dakota. M'Naghten is not
followed in New Hampshire, Maine or in the District of Columbia.
10. People v. Horton, 308 N.Y. 1, 123 N.Y.2d 609 (1954).
11. Snell v. United States, 16 App. D.C. 501, 524 (D.C. Cir. 1900); Taylor v. United
States, 7 App. D.C. 27, 41-44 (D.C. Cir. 1895).
12. Smith v. United States, 36 F.2d 548 (D.C. Cir. 1929).
617
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and judgment and obliterate the sense of right and wrong to the ex-
tent that the accused is deprived of the power to choose between right
and wrong.13
Even with this modification, however, discontent with the District of
Columbia's test of criminal responsibility continued and increased, 14 until
finally in 1954 the United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia
Circuit), per Judge Bazelon, found that the existing rule was so inadequate 10
that it would be propitious for the court to invoke its inherent power to make
a change and adopt as law a new and broader test: 1 The Durham Rule was
born.
The new test adopted by the court was neither novel nor unprecedented,
for a similar test had been used in New Hampshire since 1870.17 The standard
of criminal responsibility under this test is capable of simple statement: "an
accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of
mental disease or defect."' 8 Judge Bazelon believed that this test would leave
the determination of criminal responsibility as an ultimate question of fact
for the jury, and would preserve legal traditions of imposing no liability in the
absence of moral blame.' 9
Reaction to the new test in the District of Columbia was immediate,
widespread and generally unfavorable. Within the District, dissatisfaction was
voiced by the press, by the Congress, by the Bar Association and most im-
portant, by the very court which had produced the rule.20 Outside the juris-
diction, not a single court has adopted the rule, and every court asked to do
so has refused.21 Criticism of Durham focuses largely on the vagueness and am-
13. Id. at 549.
14. For a listing of arguments and authorities criticizing the M'Naghten rule, see
Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 870-72 (D.C. Cir. 1954). See also Annot., 45
A.L.R.2d 1447, 1455-58 § 4 & n.10 (1956). An article defending M'Naghten is Hall, Mental
Disease and Criminal Responsibility, 45 Colum. L. Rev. 677 (1945).
15. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
16. Ibid.
17. State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1870).
18. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1954). See also State v.
Jones, 50 N.H. 369, 398 (1871). For an explanation of the rule by the court in the District
of Columbia, see Douglas v. United States, 239 F.2d 58 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Carter v. United
Staes, 352 F.2d 608, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1957). The Durham court did not define the terms
disease and defect but merely differentiated between them. See Durham v. United States,
214 F.2d 862, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1954). The court finally attempted definition of the terms
in the case of McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847, 851 (D.C Cir. 1962).
19. Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 1447, 1462 (1956); Durham v. United States, supra note 18.
For range of authority of jury under Durham, see Misenheimer v. United States, 271 F.2d
486, 487 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
20. Reid, supra note 5, at 2. For views of the United States Attorney for the District
of Columbia on the Durham Rule, see Acheson, McDonald v. United States: The Durham
Rule Redefined, 51 Geo. L.J. 580 (1963).
21. For a list of such authorities, see Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853, 866 n.22
(D.C. Cir. 1961). For examples of courts refusing to follow Durham Rule, see State v.
Crose, 88 Ariz. 389, 357 P.2d 136 (1960); Downs v. State, 330 S.W.2d 282 (Ark. 1959);
People v. Nash, 52 Cal. 2d 36, 338 P.2d 416 (1959); People v. Carpenter, 11 Ill. 2d 60,
142 N.E.2d 11 (1957); Flowers v. State, 236 Ind. 151, 139 N.E.2d 185 (1957); Common-
wealth v. Chester, 337 Mass. 702, 150 N.E.2d 914 (1958); Commonwealth v. Woodhouse,
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biguity of terms found within the rule and the difficulty of exact definition of
those terms,22 on the product or causation aspect of the rule,2 and on the fact
that the Durham Rule operates as a rule of law rather than as a rule of evi-
dence.24 Further criticism is found in the fact that medical experts are
testifying as to ultimate issues in terms conclusive of the question presented
for the jury's determination 2 5
Within three years of the Durham decision, judicial disfavor with the
rule and a desire to return to the old tests were expressed,26 but Judge Miller's
solo attack on Durham went unheeded until in 1961 another important mile-
stone in the past decade of discord and dissension over Durham in the Dis-
trict of Columbia was reached. In Blocker v. United States,2 7 a new leader in
the anti-Durham crusade took advantage of an appeal from an allegedly er-
roneous burden of proof on insanity instruction to begin in earnest an attack
on the "disease-defect test." Judge Burger, in his concurring opinion in Blocker,
shouldered past the issue discussed by the majority and called the Durham
Rule a wrong step in the right direction, and sought its modification. 28 Judge
Burger's attack on Durham was twofold and on two different levels. In a psy-
chological-philosophical approach he argued that Durham was erroneous as
it ignored will and/or choice in man.29 Pragmatically, he attacked Durham on
the ground that it placed too much weight on medical terminology, thus
giving rise to such abuses as the "week-end switch" by medical experts in
classifying certain behavior as not being disease or defect on Friday but as
being defect or disease on Monday.30 The only solution, according to Judge
Burger; is a test of criminal responsibility which incorporates ability to con-
trol one's behavior as a basis of responsibility.8 1
Proof that Judge Burger's ideas were readily received was not long in
coming. In Campbell v. United States,a2 a trial court judge of the United
401 Pa. 242, 164 A.2d 98 (1960). But note that Maine has adopted a similar test by statu-
tory fiat, Maine Rev. Stat., ch. 149, § 38-A (Supp. IV 1961).
22. Blocker v. United States, supra note 21, at 859.
23. Id. at 862.
24. Id. at 857 n.3; Reid, supra note 5, at 13.
25. See Acheson, supra note 20, at 587.
26. See judge Miller's dissent in Catlin v. United States, 251 F.2d 368 (D.C. Cir.
1957).
27. 288 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
28. Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853, 858 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
29. Id. at 867.
30. Id. at 860. judge Burger refers to the case of In re Rosenfield, 157 F. Supp. 18(D.C.D.C. 1957), wherein a testifying psychiatrist informed the District Court that between
court sessions on Friday and Monday St. Elizabeth's Hospital and its staff (of which the
psychiatrist was a member) had changed its "official view" that sociopathic or psychopathic
personality disorder was not a mental disease, and that commencing Monday morning such
conditions would be termed mental disease or disorder. For other criticism of Durham, see
Wertham, Psychoauthoritarianism and the Law, 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 336 (1954); Acheson,
supra note 20. See also 54 Colum. L. Rev. 1153 (1954); 27 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 222 (1955).
For comment favorable to Durham, see Zilboorg, A Step Toward Enlightened Justice, 22
U. Chi. L. Rev. 331 (1954); Guttmacher & Weihofen, Psychiatry and the Law (1952); 40
Cornell L.Q. 135 (1954); 43 Geo. L.J. 58 (1954); 68 Harv. L. Rev. 363 (1955).
31. Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853, 867 (D.C. Cir. 1961)
32. 307 F.2d 597 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
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States District Court for the District of Columbia, George L. Hart, Jr., gave an
instruction to the jury on the standard of criminal responsibility which fol-
lowed Judge Burger's opinion in Blocker.83 judge Hart's charge "in effect
made the 'right-wrong' test coupled with 'capacity to exercise his will so as to
choose to do or not to do the act,' the controlling criteria for imposing re-
sponsibility." 34 On appeal Judges Bazelon and Washington (both of whom had
been on the Durham Court) combined to outvote Judge Burger and to strike
down the charge of the trial court as "patently erroneous."3 5
The Bazelon-Durham proponents did, however, yield to the pressure of
the Burger "control-capacity" onslaught if only slightly. The majority in
Campbell relented so as to allow the jury to use the "capacity to choose as
one of several considerations in determining whether the act in question was
the product of mental disease or defect,"3 6 but lest anyone think that this was
in any way a retreat from Durham, the majority continued and concluded
that capacity to choose by itself "cannot be an affirmative test of criminal re-
sponsibility"3't in the District of Columbia.
The Campbell case, therefore, is not of truly major importance. It left
Durham enthroned quite solidly, and really deserves mention only as it was the
first time that capacity to choose and control behavior found any recognition
in a majority opinion. Campbell did, however, leave the door open for Judge
Burger's control tests to gain importance in later decisions, and it also provides
room for conjecture. What would have been the result if the Campbell court
had been composed of one less "Durhamite" and in his place had been seated
Judge Miller or Judge Bastian (both of whom had concurred in Judge Burger's
Blocker opinion)? This case might well have been the Waterloo of the Dur-
ham Rule.
The door of recognition that Campbell had set ajar for Judge Burger's
"Ccapacity to choose and control tests" was opened wide less than six months
later in McDonald v. United States.P8 In McDonald, the court en banc, in a per
curiam decision, met the crucial criticism leveled at the Durham Rule, which
had been the failure to adequately define the key terminology, disease and
defect,39 by holding that disease or defect "includes any abnormal condition
of the mind which substantially affects mental or emotional processes and
substantially impairs behavior controls.140 (Emphasis added.) Once again the
court stressed that the capacity to know right from wrong or inability to re-
frain from wrong are not to be independent tests,4' but the court now recog-
nized them as relevant factors (especially in determining the causal relation-
33. Gray v. United States, 319 F.2d 725, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
34. Campbell v. United States, 307 F.2d 597, 600 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
35. Id. at 605.
36. Id. at 600.
37. Id. at 601.
38. 312 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
39. Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853, 858 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
40. McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
41. Id. at 851-52.
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ship between disease and defect and the criminal act) under the Durham
Rule.42 While this was not a change in the form of Durham, it was a definite
advance in its application toward the control test result Judge Burger sought
in Blocker.4 3
McDonald is important in the line of development of the criminal re-
sponsibility test in the District of Columbia because it is, as Judge Burger
claims, a turning point, as is especially evident in its acceptance of minority
views expressed in earlier dissents.44 It is also important as it marks the de-
cline of a pure Durham Rule and the birth of a vigorous spirit of change, the
extent of which is just now being decided.
The Bazelon-Burger dissension, however, was not in any way ended by
the modifications achieved in McDonald. In the instant case these two judges4 5
met head on in concurring opinions which did not in any way treat the issue
on appeal, the denial of a pro se motion, but which dealt with each judge's
view of the effect of McDonald on Durham, and also comment on the view of
the other judge.
Judge Burger took this opportunity to recapitulate the McDonald hold-
ing4 6 and to advocate that "in the spirit of McDonald" the defendant's
capacity to control his behavior and his capacity to exercise will and choice
should be important considerations in the District of Columbia's test of crim-
inal responsibility.47 Judge Burger thus continues his ever more successful cam-
paign to achieve the demise of Durham and its replacement with the capacity
and control tests that he called for in Blocker.
Judge Bazelon, on the other hand, while realizing that the days of a pure
Durham Rule are gone forever in the District of Columbia, nevertheless strives
to limit the expansion and importance of the elements interjected by Campbell
and McDonald to precisely what is allowed by those cases. Judge Bazelon re-
jects Judge Burger's expansions, made in "the spirit of the McDonald holding,"
arguing that this is expressly what the court rejected in Campbell.48
In decisions subsequent to the Gray case, the rule remains largely as
McDonald has left it. In Hawkins v. United States,49 the Court approved a
charge taken directly from McDonald and this case neither expands nor re-
stricts the rule of McDonald.50 In Simpson v. United States,51 the court once
42. Ibid. But note that the court holds that there must be testimony on the point in
evidence to get instruction on capacity to know and to control.
43. See the dissenting opinion lauding the majority for this "advance" in McDonald v.
United States, 312 F.2d 847, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1962). (Miller, C.J., dissenting in part and
concurring in part).
44. Gray v. United States, 319 F.2d 725, 728 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
45. The other member of the court sitting on this case was Judge Wright.
46. Gray v. United States, 319 F.2d 725, 727-28 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
47. Id. at 728.
48. Id. at 726.
49. 310 F.2d 849 (D.C. Cir. 1962). The court was composed of Judges Bazelon,
Miller and Wright.
50. See Gray v. United States, 319 F.2d 725, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
51. 320 F.2d 803 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
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again adhered closely to the McDonald result, though it reiterated that the
use of .the "right-wrong" and "control" tests is now a factor under the
Durham Rule. The court held, on the facts of the case (i.e., in light of the evi-
dence. presented and in the absence of objections), that the use of "right-
wrong elements" in the instructions, even if there were no testimony directly
bearing on that subject as required by McDonald,52 is not "plain error. 58
While this may appear to be an easing of limitations on the use of "right-
wrong" and "control" elements, this result seems to be limited to this particular
factual posture as the stricter rule was soon restated.54
The latest case of consequence in the area of criminal responsibility in the
District of Columbia is Blocker v. United States55 (opinion by Chief Judge
Bazelon). After treating the issue on appeal, Judge Bazelon continued with
a restatement of the test of criminal responsibility for that jurisdiction. He gives
the accepted McDonald definition of disease and defect"0 and points out that
the ability to distinguish right from wrong may be considered, if there is
testimony on the point, to determine a causal relation between the disease and
the act.5' Once again he points out that right-wrong shall not be considered an
ultimate or independent test, but he concludes that if a defendant cannot dis-
tinguish right from wrong he cannot be held criminally responsible.68 Judge
Bazelon justifies this last statement on the ground that if such were the case
(i.e., inability to distinguish right from wrong) it could not be found beyond
a reasonable doubt that the act was not a product of this impairment. 9
The latest Blocker case60 is an accurate statement of the present test of
criminal responsibility in the District of Columbia. Clearly, the product of
disease or defect formulation of Durham still stands as the ultimate rule, al-
though ability to know right from wrong and capacity to control behavior may
now be used under that rule, if there is evidence presented relevant to these
factors, to show whether or not an act was the product of the disase or defect.
This is, of course, the interpretation of Chief Judge Bazelon, and it is un-
52. McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847, 851-52 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
53. Simpson v. United States, 320 F.2d 803, 804 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
54. Blocker v. United States, 320 F.2d 800 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
55. Ibid. Appellant, Comer Blocker, was originally convicted of murder in the first
degree on October 22, 1957. His defense was insanity. This conviction was reversed and
remanded for a new trial by the Court of Appeals in a per curiam decision, Judge Miller
dissenting. Blocker v. United States, 274 F.2d 572 (D.C. Cir. 1959). A second conviction
on the same charge was reversed and remanded by the Court of Appeals sitting en banc,
judge Burger concurring in the result, and Judges Miller and Bastian dissenting. Blocker v.
United States, 288 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1961). Blocker's subsequent conviction for second
degree murder was affirmed by a unanimous Court of Appeals composed of Judges Bazelon,
Fahy and Washington. Blocker v. United States, 320 F.2d 800 (D.C. Cir. 1963). Blocker
was sentenced to life imprisonment, or a minimum sentence of ten years assuming good
behavior. Id. at 801. Apparently at the time of his third appeal he had spent seven years
in prison, and should have spent so much time on trial or in preparation for appeal that
no time has remained for misbehavior to date.
56. McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
57. Blocker v. United States, 320 F.2d 800, 802 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid. See also Wright v. United States, 250 F.2d 4, 12 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
60. Blocker v. United States, 320 F.2d 800, 802 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
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doubtedly correct under principles of stare decisis and strict construction of
precedent.
On the other hand, while this interpretation stands now, it would appear
inevitable that further change will occur. Stoutly opposed to the strict inter-
pretation of Campbell and McDonald are the views of Judge Burger and
more than likely at least two other judges of the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals, Judges Bastian and Miller. Just as Judge Burger's views in Blocker
were influential in McDonald and wrought important modifications upon Dur-
ham, perhaps his expansive views in Gray, formed in the spirit of McDonald,
will ultimately prevail and lead either to the reversal of Durham or the re-
establishment of the right-wrong and control tests to independent and co-equal
status with Durham in the District of Columbia.
JOSEPH S. FoRxrA
PHYSICAL AND MENTAL ExAMINATioNs OF DEFENDANTS UNDER RuLE 35
I
Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 19371 it
was considered a gross breach of the sacred right of the privacy of the person
to force any person to submit to a physical or mental examination against
his will 2 To protect this policy the Supreme Court impressively decided that
there was no inherent power in a federal court to make or enforce an order
to submit to such an examination--despite the observation in the dissent that
even at common law physical or mental examinations were often ordered when
the ends of justice required.4 The "inviolability of a person" policy prevailed
until the promulgation of Rule 35(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Prior to Rule 35(a) a person could bring suit in a federal court seeking redress
for alleged injuries, yet shield himself from examination of those alleged in-
juries by the other party by pleading the inviolability of his person. Rule
35(a), however, allows the court in its discretion to order a mental or physical
examination of a party when that party's mental or physical condition are in
controversy and good cause for such examination is shown.5
1. For an official text of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as they read when they
become effective in 1938, see 308 U.S. 645. These Rules were drafted pursuant to the
authority of the Rules Enabling Act of June 19, 1934, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934), 28 U.S.C.
§§ 723b, 723c (1934). The present Enabling Act is found in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071, 2072 (1952)
and an up-to-date text of the rules is found at the end of title 28 U.S.C.A.
2. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 25 (1891).
3. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, supra note 2. But cf. Camden & Suburban Ry. Co.
v. Stetson, 177 U.S. 172 (1900) and People ex rel. Noren v. Dempsey, 10 Ill. 2d 288, 139
N.E.2d 780 (1957) which recognize such inherent power to order physical or mental
examinations in state courts.
4. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 25 (1891) (Brewer, J. dissenting). See
also 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2220 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
5. The text of Rule 35(a) is as follows:
(a) Order for Examination. In an action in which the mental or physical condition
of a party is in controversy, the court in which the action is pending may order
